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SEX DISCRIMINATION OR A HARD
PILL FOR EMPLOYERS TO SWALLOW:
EXAMINING THE DENIAL OF
CONTRACEPTIVE BENEFITS IN THE
WAKE OF ERICKSON V. BARTELL
DRUG Co.
INTRODUCTION
When Viagra was first introduced to the marketplace, it had
an immediate and far-reaching impact on American culture. Often
viewed as a miraculous drug for its ability to cure male erectile
dysfunction, Viagra has done much more than fuel the male sexual
libido; Viagra has also inspired many women to protest the per-
ceived inequity in their employers' benefits packages.' Although
reversible contraception has for decades typically not been covered
by employee health plans, Viagra was in many cases fully covered
as a prescription benefit immediately following its introduction.2
Numerous legal scholars, women's rights groups, medical pro-
fessionals, and family planning specialists have begun demanding that
women receive greater access to contraceptive benefits. Citing not
only claims of sexual and pregnancy-related discrimination due to
longstanding denials by employers and insurers for such coverage,
these groups also point to the severe physical, emotional, social, and
economic consequences that flow from a lack of access to affordable
I See Debra Baker, Viagra Spawns Birth Control Issue, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 36 (sug-
gesting that it took the immediate insurance coverage of Viagra to illustrate that the denial of
contraceptive benefits may in fact be discriminatory); Kim H. Finley, Comment, Life, Liberty,
and the Pursuit of Viagra? Demand for "Lifestyle" Drugs Raises Legal and Public Policy Is-
sues, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 837, 839, 863 (2000) (discussing the increased calls for broader con-
traceptive benefits due to the widespread coverage of Viagra by insurers); Amy Goldstein, Via-
gra's Success Fuels Gender Bias Debate: Birth Control Advocates Raise Issue, WASH. POST,
May 20, 1998, at Al (noting that broad insurance coverage for Viagra "is producing howls of
frustration from many physicians and women's rights advocates who have been waging a long,
arduous campaign" for prescription contraceptive benefits).
2 See Goldstein, supra note 1, at Al (finding that within five weeks of Viagra's introduc-
tion to the U.S. market, prescriptions for the drug were subsidized under health plans nearly as
often as birth control pills and more frequently than other contraceptive methods).
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and effective contraception.3 To address this problem, a battle has
begun on numerous fronts, aimed at guaranteeing women greater ac-
cess to contraceptive benefits. As is typically the case in American
society, one arena in which this battle is being fought is in the court-
room. In June 2001, the first victory for broader contraceptive bene-
fits for women was claimed, when the court in Erickson v. Bartell
Drug Co.4 held that the denial of contraceptive benefits constituted
sex discrimination.
The Erickson court held that an employer, providing a generally
comprehensive prescription drug plan that selectively excluded pre-
scription contraceptives, had discriminated on the basis of sex under
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), part of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 Specifically, the court found discrimina-
tion based on a disparate treatment claim, stating that "Bartell's pre-
scription drug plan discriminates against ...female employees by
providing less complete coverage than that offered to male employ-
ees."
6
Because of the national media attention that this case has gar-
nered, 7 it will surely not be the last time the issue is litigated. Similar
suits have already been filed, 8 and the court's reasoning in Erickson
will certainly be challenged and scrutinized in future litigation. Still,
this decision has far-reaching practical consequences, especially for
self-insured businesses that provide prescription benefits to their em-
ployees.
This Note will argue that the reasoning employed by the court in
Erickson was legally sound, although the court's decision would be
3 See, e.g., NARAL FOUND., PRIVATE INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR CONTRACEPTION
IMPROVES THE HEALTH OF WOMEN AND FAMILIES 1, 4 (2001) ("Access to highly effective
contraception is important to improving women's overall health and in reducing unintended
pregnancy and should be included as part of basic health care coverage."); Sylvia Law, Sex
Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 364-68 (1998) (dis-
cussing how a lack of access to contraception contributes to unintended pregnancies, which in
turn can result in harmful consequences for women, infants, and society).
4 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
5 Id. at 1276-77 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 - 2000e-17 (2000) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (2000) (PDA)).
6 Id.
I See, e.g., Lisa Girion, Judge Orders Coverage of Birth Control, L.A. TIMES, June 13,
2001, at Al; Sarah Schafer, Judge Orders Firm to Cover Birth Control, WASH. POST, June 13,
2001, at E 1.
8 See, e.g., EEOC v. UPS, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001) (denying an employer's
motion to dismiss an action asserting sex discrimination under Title VII); Lisa Girion, Com-
plaint Calls Airline Health Plans Unfair to Women, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at CI (discuss-
ing recent charges filed with the EEOC based on an employee's lack of access to prescription
contraception under her employer's health plan); Bill Rankin, Wal-Mart Facing Class-Action
Lawsuit: Lack of Worker Coverage for Birth Control Disputed, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug.
31, 2002, at Fl (reporting that lawsuits have been filed against both Wal-Mart and CVS in an
Atlanta federal district court based on the denial of prescription contraceptive benefits for fe-
male employees).
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less vulnerable to future attack if premised on a disparate impact the-
ory rather than on the disparate treatment of the employees. Further-
more, this Note will attempt to more clearly define the scope of the
court's ruling and will critically examine the practical meaning of this
decision for employers. Ultimately, given the long-term cost savings
employers will realize by providing contraceptive benefits to employ-
ees, businesses should embrace the court's decision sooner rather than
later.
Part I discusses why affordable and accessible contraceptive
benefits are so important for women and for society as a whole. Part
II reviews the judicial and legislative history that led up to the Erick-
son decision and on which that decision is grounded. Part III dis-
cusses and analyzes the basis for the Erickson decision, ultimately
concluding that, while the court's decision was legally viable, it is
vulnerable to future attack because the court's holding was based on a
theory of disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. Finally,
Part IV examines the practical meaning and potential future influence
of Erickson as applied to businesses and employers, while incorporat-
ing an economic analysis that justifies providing contraceptive bene-
fits for women.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF WIDESPREAD AND AFFORDABLE
CONTRACEPTIVE BENEFITS
Nearly half of all pregnancies in the United States are unin-
tended, including 31% of pregnancies among married women. 9 Fur-
thermore, unintended pregnancies typically result in severe conse-
quences for the mother, the baby, and society.'0 Unintended pregnan-
9 Stanley Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, FAMILY PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 26, 26-27. In 1994, 49% of all pregnancies in the United
States, or 2.65 million out of 5.38 million, were unintended. Not including miscarriages, 54%
of these unintended pregnancies ended in an abortion, while 46% of women carried the fetus to
term. Id. at 26. Other studies have placed the number of unintended pregnancies near 60%.
See INST. OF MEDICINE, THE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-
BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES I (Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995) (finding
that the percentage of unintended pregnancies in the United States exceeds other Western de-
mocracies and impacts all demographic groups within American society).
10 See, e.g., Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272-74 (examining the large body of research
that suggests that contraceptives serve a vital health care need by reducing the number of unin-
tended pregnancies); ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., ISSUES IN BRIEF: U.S. POLICY CAN REDUCE
COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION 1 (2000), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
ib_0799.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002) [hereinafter COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION]
("Unintended pregnancies have ramifications for individual and public health."); NARAL
FOUND., supra note 3, at 4 (discussing an assortment of studies and reports that detail the costs
associated with unplanned pregnancies and that support the need for more widely available
contraceptive benefits for women); Law, supra note 3, at 364-72 (describing comprehensively
the myriad of costs associated with unintended pregnancies and women's lack of access to af-
fordable and effective contraceptive benefits).
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cies commonly result in a lack of adequate prenatal care, unhealthy
maternal activities (such as smoking and consuming alcohol while
pregnant), abortions, and the delivery of low birth weight or ill ba-
bies.1 Furthermore, unintended pregnancies place substantial, un-
planned financial obligations on the parents. 12 Given the incidence of
low birth weight and ill babies as a result of unplanned pregnancies,
13
the financial burden placed on the mother and society as a whole can
be even greater.
Although broad access to affordable contraception would not put
an end to unplanned pregnancies, contraceptive use would certainly
reduce their incidence. 14  One study found that while less than ten
percent of sexually active pre-menopausal American women are not
practicing contraception, these women account for nearly half of the
unplanned pregnancies each year.'5  Another study found a 16% de-
crease in the number of unintended pregnancies in the United States
from 1987 to 1994, at least partially attributable to the "increase in
widespread and effective contraceptive use.' 16 Also, it is estimated
that access to contraception could reduce the incidence of low birth
weight babies by 12% and infant mortality rates by 10%.17  Such a
reduction would necessarily translate into less physical and emotional
strain being placed on women and babies, as well as a reduction in the
.often sizable costs associated with these events. Furthermore, studies
indicate that widespread access to reliable contraception would sub-
stantially reduce the number of abortions performed annually in the
United States. 18
11 INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 9, at 81 (detailing the harm that can flow from an un-
planned pregnancy, including a woman being at greater risk of physical abuse and abandonment
by her partner and a baby being at greater risk of physical abuse and death before the baby's
first birthday).
12 See id. ("Both mother and father may suffer economic hardship and fail to achieve their
educational and career goals.").
1- See id. (stating that an unplanned pregnancy can result in a greater risk of the baby
"weighing less than 2,500 grams at birth," or approximately 5.5 pounds).
14 See NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 4 (citing a study that found that the majority of
Americans believe that the high cost and lack of access to contraception contributes to the num-
ber of unintended pregnancies).
15 See ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS IN BRIEF: CONTRACEPTIVE USE 1 (1998), at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb contruse.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
CONTRACEPTIVE USE] (providing general statistics on contraceptive usage, access, and un-
planned pregnancies).
16 Henshaw, supra note 9, at 29. For a discussion of the increase in contraceptive use by
women, see Linda J. Piccinino & William D. Mosher, Trends in Contraceptive Use in the
United States, FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 5.
17 NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 4.
Is See ALAN GUTIMACHER INST., ISSUES IN BRIEF: THE ROLE OF CONTRACEPTION IN
REDUCING ABORTION 2 (1997), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ibl9.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2002) [hereinafter ROLE OF CONTRACEPTION IN REDUCING ABORTION] (finding
that "contraception reduces the probability of having an abortion by 85% .... most of the unin-
tended pregnancies and a disproportionate share of the resulting abortions occur among the 10%
of women who use no method of birth control").
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Contraceptive use is a reality for most women over a large por-
tion of their lives. The average woman spends over twenty years try-
ing to avoid pregnancy. 19 During this period, absent any birth control,
a sexually active woman could have twelve to fifteen pregnancies.2 °
As an average American woman hopes to have two children,2 1 effec-
tive, affordable, and reliable birth control is a necessity. There are
currently five prevalent forms of reversible prescription contracep-
tion.2 2 These include birth control pills, Norplant (implanted contra-
ception), Depo-Provera (injected contraception), intra-uterine devices
(IUDs), and diaphragms, all of which are available only to women. 3
Every year, forty-two million U.S. women are at risk for an un-
planned pregnancy.24 While many of these women have some form
of private insurance coverage, they cannot get access to affordable
prescription contraception due to a lack of insurance subsidization. 5
It is estimated that three-fourths of U.S. women of childbearing age
receive benefits through a private, employer-related health plan.
These benefits are typically delivered through a traditional large
group indemnity plan, a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), a
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), or a Point of Service network
(POS). 27  Many of these plans do provide prescription benefits but
28exclude coverage for contraceptives. A recent 2000 study found
that 60% to 87% of employers who use one of the four types of em-
ployer-related health plans provided some form of contraceptive pre-
scription benefits to their employees. 29 This constituted an increase
from three years earlier, when an estimated 35% of small company
19 See CONTRACEPTIVE USE, supra note 15, at 1.
20 See NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 4.
21 See ROLE OF CONTRACEPTION IN REDUCING ABORTION, supra note 18, at 1.
22 See NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 1. Reversible contraception refers to contracep-
tion that does not permanently render a person incapable of conceiving. A vasectomy and tubal
ligation are two methods that, for practical purposes, are not reversible forms of contraception.
See Law, supra note 3, at 368-72 (discussing the various contraceptive methods available in the
United States).
23 See id.; Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination within the Reproductive Health Care
System: Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 177-80 (1999) (describing comprehen-
sively the five most common methods of reversible prescription contraception).
24 See CONTRACEPTIVE USE, supra note 15, at 1 (stating that seven in ten women of re-
productive age are sexually active but wish to avoid pregnancy).
25 See Rachel Benson Gold et al., Mainstreaming Contraceptive Services in Managed
Care - Five States' Experiences, FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 204,
204 (discussing the implications of the shift from traditional insurance plans to managed care
insurance plans on the subsidization of prescription contraception).
26 See id. (defining childbearing age as being aged fifteen to forty-four).
27 For definitions of these various plans, see infra notes 31, 36, 39.
28 See Gold et al., supra note 25, at 205.
29 Lisa Girion, Costs and Benefits; Employers Weighing Birth Control Coverage Consider
Other Factors Besides the Upfront Expense, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Wl ("The likelihood
that an employee has job-related contraceptive coverage varies, depending on company size and
the types of insurance plans, if any, that are offered.").
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indemnity plans and 68% of large company HMO plans offered some
form of coverage.30
Among typical large group insurance plans, 49% do not cover
any of the five methods of reversible prescription contraception.31
This limitation in coverage exists even though 97% of these plans
provide for some form of prescription drug coverage.32  The most
popular reversible contraceptive method among American women,
the oral contraceptive, is covered by only 33% of these large group
plans.33 Many women cannot use certain methods of birth control for
medical reasons, thus necessitating that another method be available
to them.34 In fact, only 15% of large group insurance plans cover all
five methods, even though alternative contraceptive choices are
essential to a woman's health and well being.35
HMO plans fare slightly better in providing women access to
contraceptives as 93% cover at least one contraceptive method.36
Still, only 39% of HMO plans routinely cover the five methods listed
above, and even when an HMO does cover a Norplant insertion or the
insertion of an IUD, the devices themselves are not regularly covered
under existing insurance policies.37 The devices must then be paid for
out-of-pocket, with Norplant costing approximately $450 and an IUD
costing $240.38
PPO plans and POS networks reveal a similar pattern in cover-
age gaps for contraception. 39 Forty-nine percent of PPO plans and
19% of POS networks typically provide no coverage for any method
of reversible prescription contraception.40  Only 18% and 33%, re-
spectively, will regularly cover all five forms of contraception. 41
These plans also regularly fail to cover contraceptive devices, result-
30 Id.
31 COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION, supra note 10, at 2 (defining large group insur-
ance plans as traditional fee-for-service indemnity plans written for 100 or more employees).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at I (noting that, for example, many women cannot
use hormonally based contraceptives such as birth control pills, necessitating access to other
forms of contraception).
35 COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION, supra note 10, at 2. See also EEOC, Decision on
Coverage of Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-
contraception.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) [hereinafter EEOC Decision] (discussing the
importance of women having access to all five forms of prescription contraception).
36 COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that a traditional
HMO is where "participants may obtain a wide range of care, but through a limited network of
providers").
37 NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 1.
38 See COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION, supra note 10, at 2.
39 These are systems where "enrollees have considerable flexibility in their choice of
providers but pay more out of pocket if they do not use a designated or network provider." Id.
at 3.
40 NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 2.
41 Id.
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ing in insurance subsidization when an IUD is inserted, but no cover-
age for the actual cost of the IUD.42 Additionally, it is interesting to
note that regardless of contraceptive coverage, large group plans,
HMOs, PPOs, and POS networks routinely cover surgical steriliza-
tion, abortion, and maternity care.4 3
Primarily due to large gaps in coverage for prescription contra-
ception, women of reproductive age spend, on average, 68% more in
out-of-pocket health care costs than men.44 Without insurance cover-
age, women will typically pay anywhere from $300 to $700 annually
for contraception, depending on the method best suited for them.45
Furthermore, according to one study, 85% of women aged twenty to
forty-four who have ever been sexually active report using oral con-
traceptives at some point in their lives.46 The cost of oral contracep-
tives is estimated at $360 annually. 47  Since one in six women be-
tween the ages of fifteen to forty-four have household incomes below
150% of the federal poverty level,48 this expense can be prohibitive,
driving these women to use birth control less frequently or to rely on
less effective methods of contraception. 49  Also, while most private
42 See id. (noting that while 46% of POS networks cover IUDs and diaphragms, only 25%
of PPOs cover IUDs and only 23% insure for diaphragms).
43 See id. at I (discussing inclination of insurers to cover surgical procedures rather than
preventive care, regardless of costs); see also COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION, supra note
10, at 3 (noting that nearly nine out of ten health plans cover sterilization, and abortion is cov-
ered by two-thirds of all plans).
44 See NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 3 (finding that "reproductive health care services
account[] for much of the difference" in health care expenses between men and women).
45 See COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION, supra note 10, at 2 (explaining that supplies
alone can cost $450 for Norplant and $240 for an IUD, not including the expense associated
with the outpatient doctor visits needed to attain the contraception).
46 See JACQUELINE E. DARROCH, ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., COST TO EMPLOYER
HEALTH PLANS OF COVERING CONTRACEPTIVES 4 (1998), available at http://www.guttmacher.
org/pubs/kaiser_0698.html [hereinafter COST TO EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS] (finding that birth
control pills are the most prevalent form of reversible contraception in use in the United States,
with nearly equal levels of usage regardless of age, race, geographic location, marital status,
education, or income).
47 COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION, supra note 10, at 2.
48 CONTRACEPTIVE USE, supra note 15, at 1.
49 See ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., ISSUES IN BRIEF: CONTRACEPTION COUNTS: STATE-BY-
STATE INFORMATION 1 (1999), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ib22.html [herein-
after CONTRACEPTION COUNTS] (explaining that lower-income women often use birth control
incorrectly, do not use contraception regularly due to the cost, or cannot afford a more reliable
method of birth control); Jacqueline Darroch Forrest & Jennifer J. Frost, The Family Planning
Attitudes and Experiences of Low-Income Women, FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, Nov.-
Dec. 1996, at 246, 246 (finding that in one study 74% of pregnancies to women living 150%
below the federal poverty line were unplanned, as opposed to 52% of pregnancies among higher
income women). It should be noted that there are numerous free, publicly supported family
planning services available to lower-income women through a variety of channels, although
such services are not consistently accessed. See generally COST BARRIERS TO CONTRACEPTION,
supra note 10, at 4-6 (describing the success that Medicaid and Title X have had in "improving
the health and financial well-being of women and their children," but noting that these programs
still need to be expanded); CONTRACEPTION COUNTS, supra, at I (noting that many women
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health insurance policies cover outpatient medical services, they regu-
larly exclude outpatient contraceptive services that are often vital to
protecting and maintaining a woman's health.5°
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW PRIOR TO ERICKSON
A. The Geduldig and Gilbert Decisions
To understand the basis of the court's decision in Erickson, the
development of the law surrounding pregnancy-related sexual dis-
crimination must be examined. One early case that dealt with this
issue was Geduldig v. Aiello.51 In Geduldig, the denial of coverage
for normal pregnancy under the California disability insurance pro-
gram was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.52 The program at issue paid benefits to "persons
in private employment who are temporarily unable to work because
of disability not covered by workmen's compensation." 53 The pro-
gram was mandatory for all employees who did not have private cov-
erage, and all employees had to pay one percent of their salary into
the fund, up to a certain fixed annual amount. In the event of an ex-
tended disability that required absence from work or hospitalization,
the employee could collect benefits under the program. The plan
covered disabilities that included any physical or mental illness or
injury that prevented employees from performing their normal work-
related duties.54 The plan specifically excluded any coverage for
normal pregnancies.55
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held that denying preg-
nant women disability benefits did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The majority justified this position primarily on the addi-
tional costs that would be incurred if the program covered disabilities
arising from normal pregnancy. 56 The Court stated that California
"ha[d] an interest in distributing the available resources in such a way
living in poverty have no Medicaid or private insurance and may live far from publicly subsi-
dized family planning centers); ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS IN BRIEF: CONTRACEPTIVE
SERVICES 1-2 (1998) (detailing the myriad of services provided under federal and state sup-
ported Medicaid, as well as under Title X of the Public Health Service Act).
5o See INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 9, at 153 (discussing the need for routine pelvic
examinations in order to receive oral contraceptives); NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 1-2
(noting that even when contraception is covered, the cost to visit the doctor to procure the con-
traception is often not covered).
51 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
52 Id. at 486-87.
51 Id. at 486.
54 See id. at 487-89 (detailing how the benefits plan operated).
51 Id. at 489 ("In no case shall the term 'disability' or 'disabled' include any injury or
illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such preg-
nancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.").
56 Id. at 495-97.
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as to keep benefit payments at an adequate level for disabilities that
are covered, rather than to cover all disabilities inadequately., 57 Fur-
thermore, the Court held that excluding pregnancy from coverage did
not discriminate against women:
There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the
risks insured by the program worked to discriminate against
any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk
protection derived by that group or class from the program.
There is no risk from which men are protected and women
are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are
protected and men are not.58
The Court went on to state that "[tihe program divides potential re-
cipients into two groups - pregnant women and nonpregnant per-
sons." 59 As both men and women constitute nonpregnant persons, the
Court reasoned that benefits under the program were fairly delivered
to both sexes.6°
Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan noted that men received full
compensation for many male-specific disabilities, while pregnancy,
which affects only women, was specifically excluded. "In effect, one
set of rules is applied to females and another to males. Such dissimi-
lar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical characteris-
tics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimi-
nation.'
Two years after the decision in Geduldig, the Supreme Court re-
visited the issue of pregnancy-related sex discrimination in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert.62 Although factually similar to Geduldig, the
employees in Gilbert brought their claim under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.63 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 64 In Gilbert,
female employees of General Electric brought a class action against
the company. The employees asserted that the company's benefits
plan was discriminatory because pregnancy was not a recognized dis-
ability that allowed for coverage under the plan. Following judgment
57 Id. at 496.
58 Id. at 496-97.
59 Id. at 496-97 n.20.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2- 2000e-17 (2000).
64 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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for the employees in the lower courts, a divided Court found in favor
of the employer.
65
Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion, relying heavily
on the Court's reasoning in Geduldig. "There is no more showing in
this case than there was in Geduldig that the exclusion of pregnancy
benefits is a mere 'pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimina-
tion against the members of one sex or the other.'"66 Furthermore, the
Court noted that "gender-based discrimination does not result simply
because an employer's disability-benefits plan is less than all inclu-
sive., 67  The Court also found that there was a presumed parity in
coverage for both men and women, even though an added risk,
namely pregnancy, was not covered by General Electric's disability
plan.68
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that General Electric's dis-
ability-benefits plan did in fact constitute sex discrimination under
Title VII by excluding pregnancy from coverage. After discussing
the relevance of Geduldig, Brennan stated that "it offends common
sense to suggest that a classification revolving around pregnancy is
not, at the minimum, strongly 'sex related."'69 Joining in dissent,
Justice Stevens wrote that "the rule at issue places the risk of absence
caused by pregnancy in a class by itself. By definition, such a rule
discriminates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become preg-
nant which primarily differentiates the female from the male."70 Fur-
thermore, Stevens concluded that "[tihe analysis is the same whether
the rule relates to hiring, promotion, the acceptability of an excuse for
absence, or the exclusion from a disability insurance plan."71
B. Congress' Response: Passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA)
In response to the Court's decision in Gilbert, Congress passed
the PDA in 1978.72 The PDA builds on Title VII's prohibition
against employer discrimination due to an employee's sex by incorpo-
rating pregnancy into the definition of discrimination "on the basis of
sex. 73 Congress concluded that the majority in Gilbert had incor-
65 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 125-26.
6 Id. at 136 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974)).
67 Id. at 138-39 (citation omitted).
68 Id. at 139.
69 Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
71 Id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
73 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). The PDA provides, in pertinent part:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
[Vol. 53:531
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rectly interpreted Title VII by not finding it discriminatory to deny
disability benefits to pregnant employees.74 The PDA's legislative
history provides further support for the notion that the PDA was en-
acted to overrule the Court's decision in Gilbert.75 On numerous oc-
casions in the legislative record, members of Congress mentioned
how the dissenting justices in Gilbert had in fact interpreted Title VII
correctly. 76 Given the result in Gilbert, Congress felt it necessary to
clarify the bounds of Title VII and assure that women would not be
subject to further pregnancy-related sex discrimination.77
C. Coverage for Prescription Contraception Based on the PDA
Although the PDA provided equal treatment for pregnant women
in the sphere of employment, it did not specifically address the cover-
age of prescription contraception. This was to be expected, given that
the PDA was specifically enacted in response to the denial of disabil-
ity benefits for pregnant women. 78 In a 1998 article, Sylvia Law put
forth one of the earliest legal arguments that prescription contracep-
tion should be covered under the PDA.79  Law argued that the PDA
did not solely cover pregnant women and could logically be inter-
preted to necessitate insurance coverage for prescription contracep-
tion.8° Furthermore, she painstakingly noted the physical, social, and
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons
not so affected ....
74 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983)("When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its disapproval of
both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision.").
75 See id. at 678-82 (providing a thorough analysis of the legislative events surrounding
the enactment of the PDA); Erickson v. Bartell' Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268-71 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (discussing extensively the legislative history of the PDA).
76 See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 679 (concluding that congressional proponents of the
PDA felt it "necessary to reestablish the principles of Title VII law as they had been understood
prior to the Gilbert decision"); Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (citing congressional state-
ments in support of Justice Brennan's and Justice Stevens' interpretation of Title VII).
77 See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678-82 (expressing that Congress's intent was to protect
all workers including, but not limited to, pregnant women); Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270(explaining that Congress passed the PDA in response to Gilbert and with it, set forth a broader
interpretation of Title VII).
78 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274 (explaining that when Congress enacted the
PDA, it wanted to immediately remedy obvious pregnancy-related discrimination in the work-
force, but had "no specific intent regarding coverage for prescription contraceptives.").
79 Law, supra note 3.
80 Id. at 377-83 (justifying extensively how contraceptive benefits do fall under the PDA's
definition of "pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions").
2002]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
economic ills that were caused by a -lack of affordable prescription
contraception.81
Law concluded that denying coverage for prescription contracep-
tion did constitute sex discrimination under the PDA based on a dis-
parate impact theory.82 To prove disparate impact, an employee must
demonstrate that "employer policies ... are neutral in form but dis-
criminatory in effect .... [T]he challenged employment practices 'in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another, without justifica-
tion.' ' 83  Specifically, Law stated that the denial of contraceptive
benefits for women was based on the "technological limitation" of
prescription contraception being available only to women. 84 There-
fore, "treating the exclusion of coverage for prescription contracep-
tives as a facially neutral policy that has a discriminatory impact upon
women seems more appropriate. 85  Additionally, women typically
bear the cost of obtaining prescription contraception, not to mention
the physical and emotional burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, thus
further demonstrating the disproportionate impact.
86
In December 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) delivered a decision finding that the exclusion of
prescription contraception from an otherwise comprehensive prescrip-
tion drug plan constituted discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in
violation of the PDA.87 Two nurses brought charges against their
employers, alleging that their health insurance plan unfairly discrimi-
nated against women by failing to cover prescription contraception.
Although the plan covered numerous prescription drugs and preven-
tive medical techniques, the plan did not cover any form of prescrip-
tion contraception. 88 The employer argued that no discrimination was
81 Id. at 364-68 (finding that in addition to the potential harm caused to women by a lack
of access to effective and affordable contraception, unwanted children are at greater risk for
psychological disorders through infancy, adolescence, and adulthood).
82 Id. at 374-75 (stating that such exclusion disproportionately affected women because
women bear the out-of-pocket expense and bear all the risks and hassles of using contracep-
tives).
83 Id. at 374 (quoting Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 681 (8th Cir.
1996)).
84 Id. at 374.
85 Id. Law also states that "[elven if technology were to make effective prescription con-
traception available to men, excluding contraception from insurance coverage would still dis-
proportionately impact women. Women, and only women, bear all the physical burdens of
unwanted pregnancy." Id. at 375.
86 See id. at 374-75 (detailing the harsh impact a lack of contraceptive benefits can have
on women and noting that more than twice as many women than men have health care costs
exceeding ten percent of their income).
-87 EEOC Decision, supra note 35.
88 Id. Included for coverage under the plan were vaccinations, weight loss drugs, drugs to
control blood pressure and cholesterol levels, Viagra, and preventive dental care, Id.
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present because, on its face, the benefits plan did not distinguish be-
tween the sexes.89
Based on the PDA, the EEOC stated that employers could not
treat pregnant women differently from others unable to work.90 The
EEOC then extended its interpretation of the PDA to include protec-
tion for women based on the capacity to become pregnant.91 Thus,
pregnant women were not the only covered class under the PDA, but
all women who had the capacity to become pregnant were entitled to
protection from discrimination under the PDA.92 The commission
went on to conclude that, by denying female workers access to pre-
scription contraception, women were being discriminated against
based on their capacity to become pregnant.93 This conclusion fol-
lowed whether the woman sought birth control for pregnancy avoid-
ance or for an entirely unrelated medical condition.
94
Ultimately, the EEOC decision was based on two grounds: that a
classification based on contraception was a classification based on
pregnancy, and that denying contraceptive benefits amounted to dis-
parate treatment.95 Unlike the disparate impact theory, disparate
treatment involves an "employer ... treat[ing] some people less fa-
vorably than others because of their . . . sex."96 The EEOC never
reached a decision on whether a disparate impact claim, as suggested
in the Law article, would also have merit.97 The EEOC ordered the
employers in this case to provide coverage for contraception at a level
equal to the coverage provided for all drugs, devices, and services
used to prevent medical conditions. This included coverage of outpa-
tient services for doctor visits that were needed to obtain prescrip-
tions.98 Although the Commission's decision was binding on the par-
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. ("The PDA's prohibition on discrimination against women based on their ability
to become pregnant thus necessarily includes a prohibition on discrimination related to a
woman's use of contraceptives.").
92 See id. ("[T]he Commission concludes that the PDA covers contraception based on its
plain language, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, and Congress' clearly ex-
pressed legislative intent.").
93 Id. (noting that prescription contraceptives are available only for women and any re-
fusal of coverage for them is a sex-based exclusion).
94 See id. (noting that one employee who brought charges sought birth control for medical
purposes unrelated to pregnancy prevention, while the other employee sought birth control to
avoid an unplanned pregnancy).
95 Id.
96 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
97 EEOC Decision, supra note 35, at n.22.
98 Id.
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ties to the dispute, it did not constitute legal precedent. 99 Still, courts
will typically show some degree of deference to EEOC rulings. 1oo
III. EXAMINING THE ERICKSON DECISION
A. The Court's Reasoning and the Employer's Counterarguments
The Erickson decision was based on a foundation similar to the
EEOC ruling. The plaintiff was a female pharmacist who worked for
Bartell Drug. The plaintiff brought suit, as a class action, challenging
her employer's denial of contraceptive benefits as sex discrimination.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that the em-
ployer's exclusion of prescription contraceptive benefits from an oth-
erwise comprehensive prescription drug plan constituted disparate
treatment, amounting to sex discrimination under the PDA.10
Bartell Drug was a self-insured employer that covered a range of
medications, including many preventive drugs. 0 2 Included in cover-
age were "cholesterol-lowering drugs, hormone replacement thera-
pies, prenatal vitamins, and drugs to prevent allergic reactions, breast
cancer, and blood clotting."' 103 Excluded from the plan were drugs
that aided in weight reduction, infertility drugs, smoking cessation
drugs, Viagra, growth hormones, experimental drugs, and all five
forms of reversible prescription contraception. 104 Based on the exclu-
sion of contraception from coverage, the plaintiff pursued a claim of
discrimination based on both the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment theories.1
0 5
The court justified its decision by relying on the judicial and
statutory history surrounding Title VII and the PDA. The court first
noted that fringe benefit plans that distinguish between the sexes con-
stitute discrimination under Title VII, as fringe benefits such as health
insurance are "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, '1°6 and are thus included within the scope of Title VII.
99 See id. The decision set forth the Commission's view of the law as applied to the facts
of the case. Other employers were not required to heed the decision and implement changes in
their own benefit plans, although such changes were recommended. Id.
10o See, e.g., EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (holding
that an EEOC interpretation under Title VII "need only be reasonable to be entitled to defer-
ence"). The majority in Gilbert did, however, sidestep EEOC guidelines, as have other courts.
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976).
101 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268, 1276-77 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
102 Id. at 1268n.1.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1268 n.2.
106 Id. at 1269 n.3 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 682 (1983)). In Newport News, the Supreme Court held that an insurance policy that gave
complete coverage to male spouses of female employees but only partial coverage for female
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..... The court then delved into the legislative history of Title VII and
the PDA. 07 In regards to Title VII, "the goal.., was to end years of
discrimination in employment and to place all men and women, re-
gardless of race, color, religion, or national origin, on equal footing in
how they were treated in the workforce. ' 8 The court went on to
note that Congress has been ready to step in and clarify Title VII, es-
pecially in the face of a restrictive application by the courts. Thus, in
the face of the Gilbert decision, Congress enacted the PDA to empha-
size that pregnancy-related discrimination constitutes unlawful dis-
crimination based on sex.l °9 In essence, "Congress intended to cor-
rect what it felt was an erroneous interpretation of Title VII by the...
Supreme Court."'' ° When enacting the PDA, supporters in Congress
often referred to the dissent in Gilbert, suggesting that Justices Bren-
nan and Stevens had in fact correctly interpreted Title VII with their
broader and more inclusive views. "1
Given this backdrop, the court then moved toward its findings.
In holding that sex discrimination was evident, the court's analysis
can be broken down into two main sections: (1) prescription contra-
ception is a "pregnancy-related" issue, thus falling under the PDA,
and (2) the denial of contraceptive benefits, under the facts in Erick-
son, supports a finding of sex discrimination. Turning to the first is-
sue, the court stated that "[t]he PDA is not a begrudging recognition
of a limited grant of rights to a strictly defined group of women who
happen to be pregnant.""12 Relying on International Union v. John-
son Controls, Inc.,' 13 the Erickson court held that denying coverage
for prescription contraception amounted to disparate treatment based
on a woman's capacity to become pregnant. 14 Thus, both pregnant
women and women who could potentially become pregnant were pro-
tected under the PDA. 1
5
In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court held that classifying
employees based on childbearing capacity, irrespective of whether a
woman is in fact pregnant, constitutes sex discrimination under the
PDA.' 6 Johnson Controls involved a group of female employees
spouses of male employees discriminated against the male employees; thus, the Court looked at
relative comprehensiveness of coverage offered to the sexes. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 685.
107 For an extensive discussion of the legislative history surrounding the PDA, see supra
notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
108 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
'09 Id. at 1269-70.
I1o Id. at 1269.
IM d. at 1269-70.
112 Id. at 1271.
13 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
"4 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72.
115 Id. at 1271.
116 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198-99.
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who challenged their employer's policy of forbidding women with the
capacity to bear children to engage in jobs that involve lead expo-
sure.117 Although these women were not pregnant, the classification
was deemed to constitute sex discrimination, because women were
being treated differently based on their capacity to become preg-
nant. 
118
Analogously, the Erickson court held that women were being
denied benefits because of their capacity to become pregnant." 9 In
holding that contraceptives fall within the scope of the PDA, the court
also recognized that "[m]ale and female employees have different,
sex-based disability and healthcare needs, and the law is no longer
blind to the fact that only women can get pregnant, bear children, or
,,120use prescription contraception.
Addressing the second issue, the court found disparate treatment
of the female employees. 21  To prove disparate treatment, one must
demonstrate that an "employer ... treats some people less favorably
than others because of their . . . sex.' ' 122 Specifically, the Erickson
court found that "mere facial parity of coverage does not excuse or
justify an exclusion which carves out benefits that are uniquely de-
signed for women." 123  The court further stated that excluding
women-only benefits from a health plan that was generally compre-
hensive constituted sex discrimination under Title VII, even though it
did not appear that Bartell Drug was intentionally discriminating
against its female employees. 1
24
The court never did reach a conclusion on whether a disparate
impact claim would also be meritorious, but noted that Bartell Drug
was not under an affirmative duty to provide any prescription drug
coverage. Still, by providing a comprehensive prescription drug plan
that excluded only a few distinct items, the company must be sure that
those exclusions do not result in a sexually discriminatory benefits
plan. 25 "In light of the fact that prescription contraceptives are used
only by women, Bartell's choice to exclude that particular benefit...
is discriminatory."' 126 Therefore, based on Title VII and the PDA, the
117 Id. at 187.
118 Id. at 211.
19 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
120 Id. The court went on to state that "[t]he special or increased healthcare needs associ-
ated with a woman's unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the same extent, and on
the same terms, as other healthcare needs." Id.
121 Id. at 1271-72.
122 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
123 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
124 Id. at 1272 n.7 (citing Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1080-86
(1983) ("Where a benefit plan is discriminatory on its face, no inquiry into subjective intent is
necessary.").
125 Id. at 1272.
126 Id.
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court held that all five forms of prescription contraception should be
covered on the same terms and to the same extent as other drugs, de-
vices, and preventive care. The decision also granted equal coverage
for outpatient services and physician consultations associated with
obtaining the needed contraception.
27
The Erickson court addressed six distinct arguments put forth by
Bartell Drug. First, the court tackled the issue of whether contracep-
tive coverage constitutes a health care need necessitating coverage.
28
Given that contraception is preventive in nature and does not treat an
illness, Bartell Drug argued that it should be permitted to exclude
such benefits from coverage. The court painstakingly noted the often
severe physical, emotional, social, and economic consequences that
can flow from an unwanted pregnancy to rebut Bartell Drug's argu-
ments.129 "[T]he adverse economic and social consequences of unin-
tended pregnancies fall most harshly on women and interfere with
their choice to participate fully and equally in the 'marketplace and
the world of ideas."",130 The court also rejected the argument that con-
traception was preventive in nature by noting that numerous drugs
covered under Bartell Drug's prescription drug plan were preventive,
including drugs to prevent blood clotting and drugs to lower blood
pressure. 13' Additionally, the court found it irrelevant that "preg-
nancy is a 'natural' state and is not considered a disease or illness."'
' 32
The judge reasoned that "[b]eing pregnant, though natural, is not a
state that is desired by all women or at all points in a woman's
life." 1
33
Second, Bartell Drug argued that prescription contraceptives are
not "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" covered
under the PDA.134 Returning again to legislative history, the court
dismissed this argument.' 35 Although the court recognized that Con-
gress likely had no specific intent as to whether the PDA covers pre-
scription contraception, "Congress' decisive overruling of [Gilbert]
evidences an interpretation of Title VII which necessarily precludes
the choices Bartell has made in this case."'136 Furthermore, the court
127 id. at 1277.
128 Id. at 1272-74.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1273 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975)). The Erickson court
also quoted language from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) ("The abil-
ity of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facili-
tated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.").
131 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1273-74.
132 Id. at 1273.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1274 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
135 See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
136 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
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pointed out that Johnson Controls extended coverage of the PDA be-
yond women who were currently pregnant to include women with
childbearing capability. 1
37
Bartell Drug also argued that it should be allowed to limit cover-
age under its benefits plan to keep costs from spiraling out of con-
trol.138 Although Bartell Drug was free to uniformly raise deductibles
or cut benefits, the court found that the company could not systemati-
cally exclude coverage that disproportionately affected women. 139
Furthermore, added costs do not excuse denying benefits when such a
denial constitutes a violation of Title VII. 140
Moreover, Bartell Drug argued that all exclusions from prescrip-
tion drug coverage were gender neutral. Specifically, Bartell Drug
contended that it had chosen to exclude all "family planning"
drugs.' 41 Viagra was not covered under the employee prescription
drug plan, thus demonstrating that both men and women were equally
subject to certain exclusions. 142 The court countered these arguments
by noting that numerous "family planning" aids were in fact covered
under theprescription drug plan, including prenatal vitamins1 43 and
abortion.' Also, even though infertility drugs were not covered un-
der the plan, this exclusion appeared to affect both men and women
equally. As for the lack of coverage for Viagra, the court noted that
male employees might also have a viable cause of action under Title
VII, although that issue was not presented to the court.
14 6
Aside from these arguments, Bartell Drug also suggested that the
denial of contraceptive benefits should not constitute sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII because there was no judicial precedent for such
a finding. "47 Yet, as the judge correctly noted, this case was a matter
137 See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
138 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
139 See id. ("[T]he method by which the employer seeks to curb costs must not be discrimi-
natory.").
140 id. (citing City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-
17 (1978) (finding that a cost justification defense under Title VII has never been recognized by
Congress or the courts)).
141 Id. at 1274-75.
142 Id. at 1275.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1275 n.13. ("Abortion is, after all, the quintessential 'family planning' measure,
and yet it is covered in all circumstances, even though it is specifically excluded under the
PDA.").
145 Id. at 1275. The court, however, made no determination as to whether the denial of
infertility drugs constituted sex discrimination, but noted that several courts had found that such
an exclusion is not discriminatory. Id. at 1275 n.14.
146 Id. at 1275 n.12.
147 Id. at 1275-76.
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of first impression for the courts, and the EEOC decision issued in
December 2000 was entitled to deference.1
48
Finally, the court dismissed the rather weak argument put forth
by Bartell Drug that such a mandate for contraceptive prescription
coverage is better left to the legislative branch. 49 The court stated
that it is the role of the judiciary to interpret existing law. By con-
cluding that Bartell Drug was liable for sex discrimination under Title
VH for denying contraceptive benefits to female employees, the court
was merely construing existing law.
50
B. Issues not Sufficiently Addressed in the Erickson Decision
Although the Erickson court's reasoning appears legally
sound, the court should have discussed certain issues more thor-
oughly. Perhaps the strongest argument an employer could make
in denying contraceptive coverage is that the coverage does not
fall within the plain language of the PDA, and this argument was
made by Bartell Drug.15' The PDA covers "pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions,"'' 52 and the argument could certainly
be made that prescription contraception does not constitute a
medical condition related to pregnancy. It is clear that in enacting
the PDA, Congress sought to overrule the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gilbert.'53 In that case, an employee was denied disability
for a pulmonary embolism that was suffered while on pregnancy
leave. 5 Although not caused by the pregnancy, if the employee
had suffered the embolism while not already on pregnancy leave,
she would have been covered under General Electric's disability
plan. 55 Therefore, the argument could certainly be made that "re-
lated medical conditions" refers to disabilities arising during preg-
nancy but not necessarily because of the pregnancy. Such a defini-
tion, however, would not include prescription contraception.
148 Id. at 1275-76. See also Law, supra note 3, at 385-91 (providing several explanations
for why no cases involving the denial of contraceptive benefits had been brought before the
courts).
149 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
150 Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.")).
151 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing the court's analysis of
whether the PDA covers prescription contraceptive coverage).
152 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
153 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See also supra notes 72-77 and
accompanying text (discussing that the PDA was enacted in response to an incorrect interpreta-
tion of Title VII by the Gilbert majority).
154 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 129 n.4.
155 Id.
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Of course, Johnson Controls did find that women cannot be
discriminated against based on the capacity to become pregnant,
56
but this holding need not necessarily extend to prescription drugs.
In Johnson Controls, women of childbearing capacity were being
discriminated against in terms of their ability to secure work.
57
Johnson Controls does not specifically address the exclusion of
prescription benefits that burdens women because they have the
capacity to become pregnant. To put this fact into perspective,
abortion was specifically excluded from the PDA.158 Therefore, if
coverage for prescription contraception was meant to fall outside
the PDA, a specific exclusion should have been included in the
statute. There is no such exclusion currently in the PDA.
Even if future courts find that prescription contraception does
not fall under the PDA, benefits may still be obtainable based on di-
rect claims of sex discrimination under Title VII. 151 It is a woman's
ability to bear children that distinguishes the sexes more than any
other sex-based difference. 6  To treat women differently under a
prescription drug plan (or alternatively for women to be dispropor-
tionately affected based on the denial of coverage) could give rise to a
sex discrimination claim under Title VII, without tying the claim to
the PDA. Furthermore, the sheer number of women in the workforce
and the high percentage of women who have at some point used con-
traceptives further supports a direct finding of sex discrimination un-
der Title VII. 16' The Erickson court did not explore this matter.
Aside from these considerations, the court did not address sev-
eral other issues, some because they were not pertinent to the specific
facts in that case and others because Bartell Drug did not proffer the
arguments. An employer could claim that no insurance carriers pro-
vide prescription contraception, thus exempting the employer from
needing to provide such benefits. 62 This argument falters, though, as
156 Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991).
157 Id. at 190-92.
158 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) ("This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health
insurance benefits for abortion.").
159 See, e.g., EEOC v. UPS, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1218-20 (D. Minn. 2001) (A Title VII
claim, not pursued under the PDA, was allowed to proceed where an employer failed to provide
its employees with prescription contraception, although the factual nature of the case varied
from Erickson.).
160 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 See COST TO EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS, supra note 46, at 4 (finding that eighty-five
percent of women who have ever had sexual intercourse reported using oral contraceptives at
some point in their lives).
162 Law, supra note 3, at 383-84 (noting that although employers might assert such an
argument, there is no basis for it under the law). Additionally, insurance companies that do not
provide adequate contraceptive coverage might be liable for aiding employers in the discrimina-
tory practice of denying equal prescription benefits to women. Id. See also Sam Skolnik, Con-
traceptive Coverage Suit: Regence Blueshield is Accused by ACLU and NARAL of Bias Against
Women Through Exclusion of Plans, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 13, 2001, at B I (dis-
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the Supreme Court in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 163 held
that "[i]t would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of
Title VII to hold that an employer who adopts a discriminatory fringe-
benefit plan can avoid liability on the ground that he could not find a
third party willing to treat his employees on a nondiscriminatory ba-
sis."'  Under such circumstances, the Court ruled that an employer
"must either supply the fringe benefit himself, without the assistance
of any third party, or not provide it at all."'
' 65
Additionally, an employer could claim that the denial of contra-
ceptive benefits is justified on religious grounds.' 66 This might work
because Title VII does provide an exemption for religious organiza-
tions. 167  Still, this exemption is extremely limited and would not
likely provide most employers a credible defense to claims of dis-
crimination under the PDA. Furthermore, an employer could assert
that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-
empts discrimination claims brought under Title VII.' 68  This argu-
ment has previously been addressed by the EEOC. 69 As was noted
by the EEOC, "ERISA preempts certain state laws that regulate in-
surance, but explicitly exempts federal law from preemption ....
[T]he fact that ERISA does not require health plans to 'provide spe-
cific benefits' does not mean that other statutes - namely Title VII -
do not impose such requirements where necessary to avoid or correct
discrimination."'
170
An employer could also claim that it was neutral in excluding
prescription contraception, because both female employees. and fe-
male dependents of male employees were denied benefits, thus caus-
ing all employees to be similarly situated. In EEOC v. UPS, 17' how-
ever, a federal district court rejected such an argument. In UPS, a
motion to dismiss disparate treatment and disparate impact claims
brought under Title VII was denied. 72 The employer in the case ar-
cussing recent suit filed against insurer by small company plan participants and individual plan
participants, based on claims that the insurer "unfairly excludes prescription contraceptives from
health plans").
163 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
164 Id. at 1090-91.
165 Id. at 1091.
166 Law, supra note 3, at 384-86 (concluding that such an exemption is extremely narrow
and would likely "carr[y] little weight" for employers seeking to avoid prescription contracep-
tive coverage).
167 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000) ("This subchapter shall not apply... to a religious cor-
poration, association, educational institution, or society .....
168 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1191 (2000).
169 EEOC Decision, supra note 35.
170 Id.
11 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001).
172 Jd. at 1217-20.
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gued that the exclusion was gender neutral, but the court found that
the plan in question burdened only female employees. 173
The court in Erickson also did not fully address other decisions
that held that the denial of infertility treatments did not constitute dis-
crimination.1 74 The reasons these precedents are important are not in
how they directly apply to Erickson, but in how they would alter the
contours of the prescription contraception debate, assuming male con-
traceptives are introduced to the marketplace. Currently, denials of
infertility drugs have been held as not discriminatory under Title VII
or the PDA, because both men and women are equally excluded from
coverage. 75 Given that men and women are equally denied coverage
for infertility drugs, there can be no disparate treatment. Analo-
gously, if a male prescription contraceptive were offered to the pub-
lic, employers denying coverage to women could also deny coverage
to men. 176 As men and women would then both be equally excluded
from coverage for prescription contraceptives, there would be no Title
VII violation based on disparate treatment. Therefore, female em-
ployees could not rely on the Erickson decision to receive contracep-
tive prescription benefits.
In fact, prescription contraception for men could be available
within a decade, if not sooner. 177 For decades, scientists have been
working on the development of a "male pill," similar to the oral con-
traceptives that are marketed to women. 178 The "male pill" would be
hormonally based and inhibit sperm formation so long as taken regu-
173 Id. at 1219 (finding that "while [the] exclusion applies to both male and female em-
ployees, it only burdens females and, according to the EEOC's allegations, is not gender neu-
tral").
174 For a discussion of the extent to which the Erickson court deals with prior decisions
relating to infertility drugs and treatments, see supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) (denying coverage for infertil-
ity treatments despite claims of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the PDA); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (find-
ing that the denial of coverage for infertility treatments did not constitute discrimination under
the ADA, Title VII, or the PDA).
175 See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1275, 1275 n.14 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (discussing the denial of infertility treatment coverage); see also infra notes 224-35 and
accompanying text (discussing various decisions dealing with denial of coverage for infertility
drugs and treatments).
176 See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 374-75 (implying that women are treated differently in
terms of contraceptive benefits merely because technology has yet to provide for male contra-
ceptives, although women still suffer from the discriminatory impact of denied coverage).
177 See Timothy Gower, The Healthy Man: A Way Men Can Take Charge of Birth Control,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at SI (discussing how, given the need for testing and FDA ap-
proval, male contraception was at least five years away); Scot Lehigh, The Male Pill: Men Will
Soon Have a New Method of Birth Control - But Will They Use It? And Will Women Trust Them
to Do So?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 2000, at F1 (quoting scientists who believed a "male pill"
should be available within five to ten years).
178 See Sharon Begley & Peggy Clausen, The Search for a Male Pill, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25,
1980, at 9 (discussing the various contraceptive methods being tested on men).
[Vol. 53:531
DENIAL OF CONTRACEPTIVE BENEFITS
larly.179 The pill would likely have to be supplemented with injec-
tions of testosterone or the implantation of "a testosterone pellet" un-
der the skin.'80 Still, the introduction of male prescription contracep-
tion does not mean that it would be widely accepted or used by
men. 181 Regardless of whether a "male pill" is popular, its mere in-
troduction could destroy the foundation of the Erickson decision.
Even if the male employees of a company never attempted to pur-
chase prescription contraception under their health plan, the employer
could deny all coverage for both female and male contraceptives.
Therefore, there could not be disparate treatment because both men
and women would be equally excluded from benefits under their em-
ployer's health plan, just as no disparate treatment was found by
courts deciding the question of coverage for infertility drugs. Thus,
the Erickson decision is vulnerable to future attacks, especially if a
male prescription contraceptive is brought to the market. 182
C. An Alternative Theory: Disparate Impact
The Erickson decision would be more insulated from future roll-
back if the court had found for the employees based on a disparate
impact theory rather than on a disparate treatment theory, as the issue
of the introduction of a "male pill" weakening the Erickson decision
would likely be moot. From a legal standpoint, a disparate impact
claim survived a motion to dismiss in EEOC v. UPS,183 a case similar
to Erickson. 184 The court in UPS stated that "because only females
can be prescribed the oral contraceptives at issue, the otherwise fa-
cially neutral exclusion falls more harshly on ... female employees..
than on male employees."' 85 To establish a disparate impact claim,
179 See id. ("When a derivative of the male sex hormone, testosterone, was tested .... it
prevented sperm formation without turning off sex drive."); Linda Formichelli, The Male Pill:
Male Contraceptive Research, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1, 2001, at 16 (finding success in a recent
study where men took female hormones every day for four weeks while simultaneously receiv-
ing injections of testosterone).
180 Lehigh, supra note 177.
1s1 Compare id. (discussing the psychological and physical aspects of contraception and
reproductive health that might inhibit men from using a "male pill"), and Rita Rubin, New Study
Says Male "Pill" Can Become a Reality, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2000, at 7A (questioning
whether a "male pill" requiring men to both take a pill and receive an injection would ever be
widely accepted), with Kimberly Palmer, Men Should Share Birth Control Burden, USA TO-
DAY, Sept. 2, 1999, at 17A (citing World Health Organization study that found men would
prefer a pill or injectable form of birth control over condoms or vasectomies).
182 Sylvia Law first made this argument. See Law, supra note 3, at 376 (examining em-
ployer arguments regarding equal exclusion from coverage). The court in Erickson apparently
ignored this argument, although the court cited Law's article on several occasions. Erickson v.
Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273, 1275 n.15 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
183 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219-20 (D. Minn. 2001)
84 For a more thorough discussion of UPS and its relationship to Erickson, see infra notes
210-23 and accompanying text.
185 UPS, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
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an employee must prove that "[an employer] uses 'employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another,' without jus-
tification." '86
Assuming both men and women had prescription contraception
available to them, a lack of coverage would still disproportionately
harm women, as "[wiomen, and only women, bear all of the physical
burdens of unwanted pregnancy."'' 87 Additionally, it is women who
must bear the emotional and financial burdens associated with unin-
tended pregnancies and childbirth. It is women whose careers may
potentially suffer due to time away from the workforce as a result of
an unplanned pregnancy. It is women who ultimately deal with the
psychological strains of childbirth, adoption, or abortion. For all of
these reasons, it is women who suffer a disparate impact when con-
traceptive benefits are denied.1
88
Thus, regardless of contraceptive offerings, the fact that women
shoulder all of the responsibility for carrying a fetus would still be
acknowledged by the courts if the Erickson decision was premised on
a disparate impact theory. This would allow female prescription con-
traception to be covered under health benefits plans, despite the even-
tual introduction of a "male pill," assuming that an employer did pro-
vide an otherwise generally comprehensive prescription drug plan.
IV. How ERICKSON WILL EFFECT BUSINESSES AND EMPLOYERS
A. The Bounds of the Erickson Decision
In finding for the employees, the Erickson court held that Bartell
Drug offered a "generally comprehensive [prescription] drug plan."'' 89
The court went on to find that "[a]lthough the plan covers almost all
drugs and devices used by men, the exclusion of prescription contra-
ceptives creates a gaping hole in the coverage offered to female em-
ployees, leaving a fundamental and immediate healthcare need un-
covered."' 90 Thus, the question arises as to what constitutes a "gener-
ally comprehensive prescription drug plan," as only employers offer-
186 Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 681 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hough-
ton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1994)). See also supra note 83 and accompany-
ing text. For a definition of disparate treatment, see supra text accompanying note 96.
187 Law, supra note 3, at 375.
188 Id. at 374-75 (describing physical and financial burdens that fall disparately on women
who use contraception or have unwanted pregnancies). See also supra Part I (discussing impor-
tance of widespread and affordable contraceptive benefits).
189 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
190 Id. at 1277.
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ing such plans are affected by the court's ruling. On this issue, the
court provided little guidance.'
9
'
It can safely be assumed that an employer cannot use the denial
of coverage for Viagra to justify the exclusion of coverage for
prescription contraceptives.' 92 Furthermore, an employer cannot deny
contraceptive benefits solely because the employer also denies cover-
age for infertility drugs and treatments. This is because denying cov-
erage for infertility drugs does not result in unequal treatment of men
and women, whereas only women are affected by a lack of contracep-
tive benefits. 93 Aside from these issues, it is unclear precisely what
levels of contraceptive coverage would be considered discriminatory
based on the court's reasoning.
The safest course for employers who question whether their pre-
scription drug plan is "generally comprehensive" is to examine the
totality of their plan. In addition to determining what drugs and de-
vices are covered, they should also look at the extent of coverage for
those drugs and devices. It can safely be assumed that any employer
providing a broad array of coverage for prescription drugs and de-
vices may fall within the bounds of the Erickson decision, although a
more concrete definition of what constitutes a "generally comprehen-
sive" plan is difficult. Once an employer determines that its prescrip-
tion benefits plan is in fact "generally comprehensive," the next issue
is to determine whether certain exclusions under the plan constitute
sex and pregnancy-related discrimination. On this issue, several ex-
amples might help define the bounds of the Erickson decision and
provide employers with guidance. In all of the following examples, it
is assumed that the employer has a comprehensive prescription drug
plan.
Initially, consider an employer that provides coverage for routine
cholesterol screenings, including both the visit to the doctor and pre-
scription drugs to lower the employee's cholesterol. The employer
also provides coverage for prescription contraception, but does not
cover the cost of the visit to the doctor's office. This result would
likely be deemed as discriminatory under the Erickson decision.'
94
191 For a discussion of the drugs and devices that were covered and/or excluded by Bartell
Drug, see id. at 1268 n.1, 1274-75.
192 See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (discussing how court said employees
denied coverage for Viagra may have a case under Title VII as well).
193 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 (explaining how the exclusion of infertility drugs
affects both men and women in the same manner); supra note 145 and accompanying text.
194 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1277 ("Bartell shall offer coverage for contraception-
related services, including the initial visit to the prescribing physician and any follow-up visits
or outpatient services, to the same extent, and on the same terms, as it offers coverage for other
outpatient services .... ); EEOC Decision, supra note 35 (requiring coverage for outpatient
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Also, an employer that does not cover all five forms of reversible
contraception, but covers variations of other drugs and devices, would
likely be in violation of Title VII. For example, consider an employer
who offers numerous forms of antibiotics under its prescription drug
plan. This assortment of prescription choices might be offered so that
employees who have allergic reactions or side effects from certain
antibiotics can still have alternative drugs to take. Under this sce-
nario, an employer would likely need to provide for all five forms of
reversible contraception.
195
One final example of a prescription plan that is likely discrimina-
tory would involve an employer who required a $10 employee co-pay
for prescriptions, except that prescription contraceptives required a
$15 co-pay. In this instance, although the employer might already
provide coverage for all forms of prescription contraception, it is only
the female employees who are burdened by the higher co-pay, and
consequently inequality between men and women results. 1
96
As these examples demonstrate, there is no clear test as to what
prescription drug plans would violate Title VII, based on the frame-
work developed by the Erickson court. What is certain is that the
Erickson decision will have long-lasting ramifications on the U.S.
business community. Employers that offer prescription benefits to
their employees but limit or deny contraceptive coverage will need to
reevaluate the extent of their coverage, or face potential liability for
discrimination under Title VII and the PDA. Still, not all employers,
regardless of prescription drug coverage, will be affected by the
Erickson decision.
B. To Whom the Decision Applies
The Erickson decision only affects employers that have fifteen or
more employees. 197 This is because the court based its findings of
services and doctor visits "to the same extent, and on the same terms" as coverage "for other
preventative or health maintenance services").
195 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1277 (requiring Bartell Drug "to cover each of the
available options for prescription contraception to the same extent, and on the same terms, that it
covers other drugs, devices, and preventative care .. "); EEOC Decision, supra note 35 (order-
ing the employer to cover all forms of prescription contraception).
196 Even if an employer attempted to justify the higher co-pay for contraception based on
the fact that this benefit accrues only to women, a court would still likely find there to be un-
equal treatment of the sexes. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U.S. 669, 685 n.26 (1983) (finding that "no [cost] justification is recognized under Title VII
once discrimination has been shown"); see also supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of a cost defense in a Title VII action, and how this issue was addressed by
the Erickson court).
197 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 n.16 (concluding that the court's decision differs
from pending legislation that might require insurance companies, HMOs, and employers with
less than fifteen employees to provide prescription contraception, in that the court's decision
applies only to self-insured employers with fifteen or more employees).
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discrimination on Title VII, which exempts firms with fewer than that
number of employees. 98  Additionally, an employer must provide
prescription benefits under its health plan for Erickson to apply. It
cannot be discriminatory to exclude a specific prescription when a
plan explicitly denies coverage for all prescriptions. 199 "However,
when an employer decides to offer a prescription plan covering every-
thing except a few specifically excluded drugs and devices, it has a
legal obligation to make sure that the resulting plan does not dis-
criminate based on sex-based characteristics and that it provides
equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes. ' 2°°  Furthermore,
Erickson only applies if the employer provides its benefits plan on a
self-insured basis. 20 1 Employers providing self-insured health benefit
plans typically pay employee claims from funds set aside by the em-
ployer or directly from company accounts. 202 "Alternatively, an em-
ployer may fully insure its plan by purchasing health and accident
insurance on behalf of plan participants from a third-party insurer. ' 20
3
The Erickson decision will apply to a growing number of em-
ployers, because an increasing number of businesses are electing to
self-insure. In fact, over sixty-five percent of employers self-insure,
and some studies indicate that about half of U.S. workers are covered
198 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (defining an "employer" covered under the statute as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year
199 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (stating that "Title VII does not require employ-
ers to offer any particular type or category of benefit").
200 Id.. See also Girion, supra note 7, at A17 (noting that many employers could "cut back
on benefits to avoid having to add contraceptive[]" benefits).
201 The Erickson decision only applies to businesses that are self-insured, as under such
plans it is the employer who decides what coverage to provide to employees, which in the case
of Erickson produced a discriminatory result. See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 n. I (noting
that "Bartell's benefit plan is self-insured"); see also NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, CON-
TRACEPTIVE COVERAGE: A MULTI-TRACK APPROACH 1 (2001), available at http://www.nwlc.
org/pdf/ContraceptiveCoverageAMulti-TrackApproach.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (discuss-
ing application to employers of Title VII claims of discrimination based on denials of contracep-
tive benefits, and stating that "[elmployers that provide health insurance that covers prescription
drugs and devices but excludes prescription contraceptives are in violation of Title Vii's prohi-
bition against sex discrimination"); Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation,
and ERISA: Defining the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 234 (1997)
(explaining the various ways in which employers might structure their employee health benefits
plans).
.202 See Paredes, supra note 201, at 234 (noting that "the employer-sponsor retains the risk.
of providing health care").
203 Id. Many employers now self-insure, but purchase stop-loss insurance to additionally
insure against the risk of employee claims exceeding a predetermined expected amount. Id. A
benefits plan structured using stop-loss insurance would still likely fall within the Erickson
decision, because at its core the employer is still electing to self-insure and define the benefits
its employees will receive.
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by a self-insured plan.204 Of course, many of these self-insured em-
ployers have less than fifteen employees. Approximately fourteen
million workers, or more than four-fifths of the U.S. workforce, are
employed by entities with less than fifteen employees, thus falling
outside the scope of Erickson.20 5 Still, looking at larger companies,
78% of employers with more than 1000 employees self-fund their
benefits plans, as well as "nearly 90% of Fortune 500 companies. ' 2°
Many businesses are electing to self-insure because ERISA 20 7 pre-
empts state regulation of self-funded plans, thus allowing employers
greater flexibility in structuring their employee benefit plans with less
government intervention.2 °8
C. Other Litigation and Legislation
The Erickson decision will surely be contested in future lawsuits,
and there is a possibility that the decision will not be followed by
other courts.209 Looking at recent cases that might have an impact on
the future relevance of Erickson, the most notable is EEOC v. UPS.210
In UPS, the EEOC brought a Title VII claim based on the denial of
prescription contraception for the spouse of a male employee, and for
other employees similarly situated. 21  The claim of sex discrimina-
tion was brought directly under Title VII, without reference to the
PDA.212 The spouse of the male employee at issue sought oral con-
traceptives to treat a hormonal disorder, but coverage was denied.1 3
The EEOC brought claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact
because UPS provided male employees with prescription treatments
for hormonal disorders. The court denied the employer's motion to
214dismiss. Examining the disparate treatment claim, the court found
that, taking all asserted facts as true, an employer cannot deny cover-
age to women when the same drugs taken for the same purpose are
covered for men. The court also noted that it was not gender neutral
204 See id. nn. 5-8 (citing recent studies which indicate a decade-long trend toward em-
ployers electing to self-insure).
205 See NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, supra note 201, at 2 ("Requiring contraceptive
coverage through enforcement of Title VII thus will not benefit these people.").
206 Paredes, supra note 201, at 234.
207 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2000).
208 See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 61 n.68 (D. Mass. 1997)
(discussing the growing number of self-insured employers and the benefit of ERISA preemption
in avoiding state insurance regulation); Paredes, supra note 201, at 235-36 (questioning whether
self-funded employers who purchase stop-loss insurance are still preempted from state regula-
tion by ERISA).
209 Erickson only serves as binding precedent in the Western District of Washington.
210 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001).
211 Id. at 1217-18.
212 Id. at 1217, 1218 n.1.
213 Id. at 1217.
214 Id. at 1218-20.
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to deny coverage for female employees and spouses of male employ-
ees.
215
In the second part of the court's decision, the EEOC argued that
even if the employer's benefits plan was gender neutral, women were
still more harshly affected. As only women "can be prescribed the
oral contraceptive at issue, the otherwise facially neutral exclusion
falls more harshly on . . . female employees ... ,, On this basis,
the court also denied the UPS motion to dismiss the disparate impact
claim.
217
Aside from these findings, future courts could embrace portions
of the UPS decision in an attempt to distinguish or reject Erickson. In
UPS, the court was not deciding whether all contraceptives should be
covered under Title VII, but rather whether oral contraceptives
needed to treat a hormone condition should be covered to the extent
male prescription hormone treatments were covered.218 Furthermore,
the court noted that UPS excluded Viagra and Propecia (used to treat
male baldness) from coverage. E19 The court found that "the exclu-
sions for Viagra and Propecia are not relevant because those drugs are
non-medically necessary and elective treatments, and are unlike the
oral contraceptives prescribed to [the female employee] as a medi-
cally necessary treatment for a serious hormonal disorder. 220 It could
be argued that based on this statement, contraception prescribed
solely to prevent unplanned pregnancy is not medically necessary, but
elective. Similarly, employers could deny coverage for Viagra and
consequently deny coverage for contraception that is prescribed
solely for pregnancy prevention. Based on the dicta of the UPS court,
such denials might not violate Title VII.221
Another issue that runs contrary to the Erickson decision in-
volves whether contraception is covered under the PDA. The EEOC
sought to amend its complaint and additionally bring a claim under
the PDA. 2  The court would not allow the complaint to be amended,
noting "serious doubts about the merits of a PDA claim in this con-
text." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
made clear that "prevention of conception is outside the scope of the
215 Id. at 1218-19.
216 Id. at 1220.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1217-18.
219 Id. at 1219 n.2.
220 Id.
221 Compare id. (allowing the exclusion of Viagra to justify the exclusion of contracep-
tion), with Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 (noting that the exclusion of Viagra does not jus-
tify the denial of coverage for contraceptive benefits when a discriminatory result is evident
under a prescription benefits plan).
222 UPS, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 n.l.
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PDA.'- 223 Of course, this ruling was issued several months before the
Erickson decision, and the UPS court's logic seems faulty, in that the
Eighth Circuit case referred to drew a distinction between potential
pregnancy, which only affects women, and infertility, which affects
both men and women.
In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,224 a female em-
ployee brought a discrimination claim under the PDA, based on the
denial of coverage for infertility treatments.225 On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer.2 6 The court
held that infertility is not a medical condition related to pregnancy or
childbirth, thus disallowing any claim under the PDA.227 The court
then distinguished International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.228 by
noting that the Supreme Court's decision involved unequal treatment
of women based on their "reproductive capacity." 229 The court con-
cluded that "[p]otential pregnancy, unlike infertility, is a medical
condition that is sex-related because only women can become preg-
nant.,, 230 This would seem to counter the statement of the UPS court
and further support the Erickson court's finding that the discrimina-
tory denial of contraceptive benefits is protected under the PDA, as
contraception is a medical condition related to the potential for preg-
nancy, affecting only women.
Furthermore, in Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.,231 an employer's
motion to dismiss an employee's claims of discrimination under the
PDA was denied.232 The employee brought her claims based on the
circumstances surrounding her attempts to become pregnant and her
eventual discharge.233 Although the employee had been undergoing
infertility treatments, the court based a PDA claim on how the em-
ployee was treated "because she intends to, is trying to, or simply has
,,234the potential to become pregnant .... The court went on to find
that "the PDA was intended to cover a woman's intention or potential
to become pregnant, because all that conclusion means is that dis-
22. Id. (citing Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1996)).
224 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
225 Id. at 675-76. The employee also asserted claims under Title VII and the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the employer on
these various claims. Id. at 675.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 679-80.
228 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
229 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680 (citing Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199).
230 Id. Accord Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that, although infertility was a pregnancy-related condition and a disability, an insurance plan
excluding coverage for surgical impregnation procedures did not discriminate against infertile
women in violation of the ADA, Title VII, or PDA).
231 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. I11. 1994).
232 Id. at 1401-04.
233 Id. at 1396-97.
214 Id. at 1401.
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crimination against persons who intend to or can potentially become
pregnant is discrimination against women, which is the kind of truism
the PDA wrote into law. 235 Given these decisions, it is apparent that
contraception available only to women is subject to the PDA, despite
the conflicting suggestion of the UPS court. Additionally, the bulk of
prior case law and the statutory history surrounding the PDA suggest
that contraception is a "related medical condition," thus insulating the
Erickson decision from future rejection.236
The question of whether the Erickson decision will stand up to
challenges in future litigation remains to be seen, but observers may
not have to wait long to find out. In late 2001, charges were filed
against American Airlines asserting pregnancy-related discrimination,
although this lawsuit was ultimately dismissed before the court could
rule on the merits of the PDA-based denial of contraceptive benefits
claim. 237 Other suits have recently been filed against both Wal-Mart
and CVS in an Atlanta federal district court.2 3 8 In the action against
Wal-Mart, a judge in August 2002 granted class action status to "all
women working for the nation's largest retailer after March 2001 and
who were using prescription contraceptives." 239 The judge refused,
however, to extend the class to male employees whose spouses use
prescription contraception.24
Even employers and insurers who are not covered by the Erick-
son ruling may wish to reevaluate their prescription benefit plan of-
ferings, as pending legislation could soon affect those businesses.
"Since 1998, 16 states have enacted comprehensive laws to address
the imbalance in prescription contraceptive coverage in private insur-
ance .... Six other states have laws, policies, or regulations that re-
235 Id. Accord Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312, 1317-20 (D. Or. 1995)
("This court agrees with Pacourek that the purpose of the PDA is best served by extending its
coverage to women who are trying to become pregnant .... [T]he Supreme Court has equated
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy with discrimination based on sex.").
236 See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
237 Alexander v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 4:02-CV-0252-A, 2002 WL 731815, at *2,
*4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2002) (finding that the employee lacked standing to bring a claim for
denial of contraceptive benefits because she never sought such benefits, while also addressing
other infertility related claims). See also Girion, supra note 8 (discussing charges filed with the
EEOC against American Airlines based on a lack of access to prescription contraception, as
company policy stated that contraception for pregnancy prevention was not medically neces-
sary, thus receiving no subsidization, although birth control prescribed for medical conditions
was covered).
238 See Rankin, supra note 8, at Fl (noting that CVS has since "changed its health plan to
include prescription birth control," although the employee who brought the lawsuit is still seek-
ing class compensation for female employees who used prescription contraceptives prior to the
policy change).
239 Id.
24 Id.
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quire some level of insurance coverage for contraception ....
More states will likely follow, as from 1998 to 2000 state legislators
introduced 121 bills requiring insurance coverage of prescription con-
traception.242 This legislation works to provide contraceptive benefits
for the sixteen million Americans who receive health insurance
through private insurance plans, not to mention the fourteen million
workers who are employed by businesses with fewer than fifteen em-
ployees and are thus outside the scope of Title VII.
243
Despite any state legislation that is passed, the majority of U.S.
workers have health insurance plans covered by ERISA. State laws
that seek to regulate health plans covered by ERISA are preempted,
thus again leaving many women without adequate prescription con-
traceptive coverage. 244  Furthermore, many states have yet to pass
legislation requiring equitable prescription drug coverage.245
As the plethora of recent state legislation has only limited reach,
a bipartisan coalition in Congress has been working toward the en-
actment of the Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive
Coverage Act (EPICC).246 The bill "would require all private insur-
ance plans that provide prescription drug coverage to provide pre-
scription contraceptive coverage. 247 EPICC was first presented to
the 105th Congress "and has since been introduced in the 106th Con-
gress and the 107th Congress." 248 Still, the bill has yet to reach the
floor of either the House or the Senate. 249 Assuming EPICC is passed
and signed into law, it would have a drastic impact on the ability of
241 NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 4. See also Julie T. Hatcher, Employment Law:
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.: Prescription for Equality in Insurance Coverage, 25 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 213, 215 (2001) (citing specific state statutory provisions dealing with required cover-
age for prescription contraceptives). Many state statutes have conscience clauses allowing an
employer to be exempted from coverage under the law on religious grounds. For a detailed
discussion of the various state laws, including each state's respective religious exemption
clause, see CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND POLICY, CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY BILLS
GAIN MOMENTUM IN STATE LEGISLATURES, at http://www.crlp.org/pub-fac-epicchart.html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2002). On at least one occasion, an employer that did not fall into a nar-
rowly drawn religious employer exemption clause has challenged the constitutionality of a state
statute requiring coverage for contraceptive benefits. The statute was upheld. See Catholic
Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Ct. App. 2001), super-
ceded by, 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001).
242 NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 4.
243 NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, supra note 201, at 2.
244 NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 5.
245 Id.
26 EPICC of 2001, S. 104, 107th Cong. (2001); EPICC of 2001, H.R. I 111, 107th Cong.
(2001). An additional 1.2 million women already receive contraceptive benefits as employees
of the federal government, thanks to legislation passed by Congress. NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW
CENTER, supra note 201, at I ("requiring all health insurance plans available to federal employ-
ees to include coverage of prescription contraceptives if other prescription drugs are covered.").
247 NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, supra note 201, at 2.
248 NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 5.
249 Id.
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U.S. women to secure prescription contraceptive benefits, aside from
the gains that might be realized through the Erickson decision.
D. The Cost of Providing Contraceptive Benefits
Employers should not view the Erickson decision as yet another
court-ordered mandate that will inflate their costs and drive down
their profits. In fact, both cost-benefit analysis and economic theory
suggest that employers would save money by providing prescription
contraceptive benefits. One recent study estimated that the cost of
providing all five forms of reversible prescription contraception under
a health benefits plan would be $21.40 per employee per year.250 This
cost is even less if an employer already provides some degree of cov-
erage for prescription contraception, not taking into account potential
cost savings that might be realized.25' Assuming that employers pay
80% of this added cost, the true cost to employers, exclusive of poten-
tial savings, would be $17.12 per employee per year, or $1.43 per
month.252 These costs "represent[] a mean increase of less than 1% in
employers' costs of providing employees with medical coverage. 253
Employees would face additional insurance payments of $4.28
per year, or about thirty-six cents per month.254 Despite this added
cost, recent polls indicate strong employee support for expanded
contraceptive benefits, even in the face of a limited increase in health
insurance premiums. 255 Seventy-three percent of Americans support
insurance coverage for contraception, even if it means that their pre-
miums could be raised anywhere from $1.00 to $5.00 per month,
amounts well above a projected thirty-six-cent monthly increase. 256
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the importance of women having
access to affordable and reliable contraception is not a gender-specific
issue. In fact, 87% of all Americans agree that family planning ser-
vices should be covered under health benefits plans.257
250 See COST TO EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS, supra note 46, at I (estimating the total aver-
age cost of providing contraceptive coverage, inclusive of administrative costs).
251 Id. at 2 ( "This estimate represents the average cost of adding coverage to a plan that
now does not cover any of these nonpermanent contraceptive methods. The cost would be less
for those plans that cover at least some of these methods ....").
252 Id. at 1. See also Eileen McNamara, Obstruction an Injustice, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23,
2002, at B I (citing the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission study, which found that the
cost to insurers of providing prescription contraception amounted to $1.39 per employee per
month).
253 COST TO EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS, supra note 46, at 1.
254 Id.
255 See NARAL FOUND., supra note 3, at 3.
256 See id. (stating that while 75% of Americans support coverage for contraceptives, only
49% support insurance subsidization of Viagra).
257 DAVID M. ADAMSON ET. AL., How AMERICANS VIEW WORLD POPULATION ISSUES: A
SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION 49-51 (2000) (citing a recent survey).
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Any additional costs associated with providing prescription contra-
ceptive benefits would likely be fully defrayed through the long-term
cost savings an employer would realize. For example, most employ-
ers do provide coverage for ectopic pregnancies, term pregnancies,
miscarriages, maternity care, and newborn hospitalizations. 8  Some
employers even cover abortions.259 Each of these services often costs
in excess of $5000.260 By covering prescription contraception, unin-
tended pregnancies would be reduced,26' thereby saving an employer
thousands of dollars over the long-term.262 As the authors of one re-
cent study concluded: "[C]ontraception saves money. Preventing un-
intended pregnancy is highly cost-effective. 263
Turning to empirical data, if a sexually active pre-menopausal
woman used no contraception, over five years she might experience,
on average, 4.25 unplanned pregnancies costing her insurer and em-
ployer nearly $15,000 under a standard benefits plan.26 Assuming a
female employee would otherwise use no contraceptive method, the
insurance savings realized over five years by providing prescription
contraceptive benefits amount to over $13,000 for Norplant and
Depo-Provera and over $12,000 for oral contraceptives.265 Although
it can be assumed that most women faced with a lack of contraceptive
benefits will purchase birth control out-of-pocket rather than not use
any method, these women may still elect to use less expensive and
less effective methods. This increases the risk of unplanned preg-
nancy, which in turn raises costs for employers under their benefit
plans. "[I]f broader coverage leads to improved access and substan-
tially more effective contraceptive use, our models suggest that pay-
ers may save resources by avoiding the costs of unintended pregnan-
cies.
Another recent study reached a similar conclusion. In that analy-
sis, it was determined that for every dollar an employer spent on con-
258 James Trussell et. al, The Economic Value of Contraception: A Comparison of 15
Methods, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 494, 500 (1995) (evaluating the impact of fifteen distinct
contraception methods on societal health care costs).
259 Id. ("Most private plans... cover induced abortions.").
260 Id. at 497 tbl.4. The costs to insurers are as follows: term pregnancy ($8619), maternity
care and delivery ($5512), ectopic pregnancy ($4994), newbom hospitalization ($3107), miscar-
riage ($1038), and induced abortion ($416). Id.
261 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between in-
creases in contraceptive use and reductions in unplanned pregnancies).
262 Trussell et al., supra note 258, at 501 fig.4 (providing, for most forms of contraception,
both the number of total unplanned pregnancies avoided over five years, as well as the "five-
year savings achieved over no method").
263 Id. at 499.
264 Id. at 497.
265 Id. at 501 fig.4.
266 Id. at 500.
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traceptive coverage, $4.40 in net savings would be realized.267 Fur-
thermore, not offering contraceptive benefits can cost a business 17%
more than if those benefits were in fact provided to employees. 268
Aside from these savings, an employer electing to provide con-
traceptive coverage would also realize several benefits that are more
difficult to quantify. Specifically, prescription contraceptive coverage
would likely result in less discontent among female workers. 269  By
achieving higher levels of worker satisfaction, businesses would see
increased productivity and less absenteeism. Also, female employees
pleased with their benefits would be more willing to stay with their
current employer rather than risk losing coverage. The consequent
reduction in employee turnover would save employers the often sub-
stantial costs associated with recruiting and training a replacement.
Furthermore, when labor markets are tight, employers can differenti-
ate themselves by providing this coverage to female employees.27'
Thus, employers offering conception coverage could potentially have
an advantage in attracting and retaining talented applicants.
From an economic perspective, employers are in a better positionthan 272
than employees to efficiently purchase contraceptive benefits. Em-
ployers can achieve economies of scale when purchasing contracep-
tion, a luxury individual employees do not enjoy. 27 3 Essentially, this
means that an employer that purchases coverage for a large group can
negotiate a bulk discount, thus generating collective savings. Fur-
thermore, tax savings can be derived when an employer pays a por-
tion of an employee's total compensation in the form of health bene-
267 Girion, supra note 29. See also CONTRACEPTION COUNTS supra note 49, at 6. (noting
that "[e]very dollar spent for contraceptive services saved $3 in public funds that would have
been needed for prenatal and newborn medical care alone."). Assuming an employer covers
prenatal and newborn medical care under its benefits plan, then that employer would also likely
realize savings by providing contraceptive benefits.
268 Girion, supra note 29 (stating that "a hypothetical business employing 80,000 people,
including 40,000 women of reproductive age" was used in the study).
269 See id. (noting the anger felt every month by many female employees who are forced to
purchase oral contraceptives out-of-pocket). Less discontent among female employees would
not likely be offset by increased discontent among male employees, despite a nominal increase
in insurance premiums, as both men and women seem to support expanded contraceptive bene-
fits. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (discussing general support among all
employers for contraceptive coverage).
270 This assumes that all other aspects of the employee's compensation would be equal.
271 See Girion, supra note 29 (citing a need among employers "to appeal to a labor market
that is increasingly female").
272 See Paul Fronstin, An Economic Model of Employee Benefits and Labor Supply: An
Application of the Almost Ideal Demand System, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND LABOR MARKETS
IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 87, 92 (William T. Alpert & Stephen A. Woodbury eds.,
2000).
273 Id. (explaining the efficiency gains through economies of scale that can be achieved
when an employer provides health insurance).
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fits. 2 74 These savings also work to counteract the employer's added
costs of providing such coverage.
Furthermore, any added cost that an employer does in fact real-
ize by covering contraceptives should theoretically be passed on to
the employees, based on the economics surrounding health benefits
and labor markets. 275 For example, assume that the government has
mandated that all employers offering prescription drug coverage pro-
vide contraceptive benefits.276 In theory, employees will desire a
compensation mix involving wages and health benefits.277 This mix
would be standard across all comparable businesses and these busi-
nesses will compete in the labor market. The requirement that pre-
scription contraception be covered would thus equally impact all
businesses, causing uniform increases in insurance premiums. These
increases would then be uniformly deducted from the wages of em-
ployees, as the mix of health benefits have now expanded. As such
an action would be taken by all businesses, no single employer would
be disadvantaged, fear losing employees to a competitor, or face a
reduction in sales or profits.278
CONCLUSION
The Erickson decision marks a significant victory in the battle
for broader contraceptive benefits. Such benefits are necessary to
reduce the number of unplanned pregnancies and to improve the
physical, emotional, and financial well-being of women and infants.
Although the decision will certainly be challenged in future litigation,
the court's reasoning appears legally sound. Still, the decision would
be more insulated from future challenge if the court had decided for
the employees based on a disparate impact basis. Regardless of such
future challenges, employers should embrace the decision, as their
benefits plans may already be affected by the court's ruling. Fur-
thermore, the long-term cost savings employers would realize by pro-
viding prescription contraceptive benefits well outweigh any potential
costs.
LEE KORLANDt
274 Id. ("[P]referential tax treatment of employee benefits reduces the price of the benefits
to both employers and employees and is thus expected to increase the demand for employee
benefits.").
275 See MARK V. PAULY, HEALTH BENEFrrS AT WORK 33-35 (1997).
276 Id. This is a modified example of an illustration used by Pauly to demonstrate who
bears the economic burden of added coverage under a health benefits plan.
277 This example ignores other elements that might be included in a total compensation
package.
278 PAULY, supra note 275, at 34.
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